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A B S T R A C T
This article explores the mobilization of power by health workers during policy implementation, showing how in
a context of discretion and resource scarcity they can reproduce inequalities in access to health services. The
argument innovates theoretically by supplementing the ‘street-level bureaucracy’ literature, which emphasizes
frontline worker discretion, with a conceptualization of power as domination encompassing the shaping of
behavior, the constitution of subjects and the reproduction of inequality. Empirically, the article focuses on
Brazilian community health workers (agentes comunitários de saúde, CHWs). CHWs are a neglected but highly
important segment of the health workforce that traditionally functions as a link between the health system and
disadvantaged groups. The article examines how Brazilian CHWs act as street-level bureaucrats mobilizing
power in their interactions with users. They operate within a severely under-resourced public health system, the
Sistema Único de Saúde, which places constraints upon their action and forces them to make allocation decisions
with little training and support. The article highlights the ways in which inequalities in access to health services
are reproduced (inadvertently or not) through the practices, discursive styles and classiﬁcations of CHWs.
Methodologically, the paper is based on ethnography with 24 CHWs and interviews with 77 other CHWs in
Brazil.
1. Introduction
Notwithstanding the constraints they encounter, health workers are
in many respects powerful. They hold knowledge and resources that
impact directly on the lives and wellbeing of populations (Feather and
Johnstone, 2001; Møller, 2009). Their insider position in the health
system puts them in a privileged position to inﬂuence behavior (Skinner
et al., 2007). Their ability to determine who can access information and
health system resources means that they can contribute to redressing or
reproducing inequalities. Power is thus an important dimension in the
practice of health workers. The way they use power shapes the im-
plementation of health policies and is crucial for their success or failure.
Sociological and public health scholarship has considered how
physicians, nurses and patients are involved in power relations
(Nettleton, 1992; Hewison, 1995; Henderson, 2003). Historical studies
have shown how physicians and other health practitioners became
powerful in colonial endeavors (Watts, 1997; Anderson, 2006). None-
theless, power remains neglected in health systems analysis and policy
discussions (Erasmus and Gilson, 2008; Sriram et al., 2018). The recent
Global Strategy on Human Resources for Health provides only vague as-
sertions about the need to ensure that health workers are ‘motivated
and empowered to deliver quality care’ (World Health Organization,
2016, 10). In this document, health workers are overwhelmingly con-
sidered apolitical actors involved in neutral and value-free relations
with patients. Power has remained largely undertheorized and under-
studied in what pertains to health worker practice in contemporary
settings. It has not been systematically considered when monitoring
health policy implementation and assessing obstacles therein.
The neglect of health worker power epitomizes a broader under-
estimation of the practice of policy implementation (Sheikh et al., 2014;
Van Belle et al., 2017). This underestimation obscures the broader re-
lations in society that shape, and are in turn shaped by, the im-
plementation of health policies. It also blinds us to the complex process
of implementation, which in some cases reveals substantial deviations
from the original design of policies. Some studies have shown that the
mobilization of power by health workers produces side-eﬀects and
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unintended outcomes (Lehmann and Gilson, 2013, Harris et al., 2014;
Scott et al., 2017). Reengaging power in health worker practice would
help to address one of the most important puzzles in policy analysis: the
gap between the original design, as conceived by formulators, and the
materialization of policies by a chain of implementers (Pressman and
Wildavsky, 1973; Hill and Hupe, 2003).
This article speaks to the relative neglect of health worker power,
and hence to existing blind-spots regarding the practice of health policy
implementation. We address the following questions: how can the
power of health workers be conceptualized? How do health workers
mobilize power in day-to-day practice, and with what consequences?
Speciﬁcally, to what extent does power contribute to diﬀerentiated
treatment and unequal access to health services and resources? Access
is an important question given the pivotal role given to health workers
in the drive to universal healthcare (World Health Organization, 2008)
and the Sustainable Development Goals (de Francisco Shapovalova,
2015). The extent to which health workers contribute to addressing or
reproducing inequalities in access to services is of crucial importance
for the future of the global health agenda.
To answer these questions, we develop a new framework for the
analysis of health worker power. We take as our starting-point the
‘street-level bureaucracy’ approach, which scrutinizes the day-to-day
practices and interactions of implementers. As proponents of this ap-
proach note, implementation depends on routine judgments, decisions
and actions of frontline workers, who have signiﬁcant discretion to
adjust policies to the local context in the face of emerging constraints
and demands. Nonetheless, this approach does not suﬃciently consider
the role of power in street-level interactions. Aiming for a richer ac-
count of health worker practice, we supplement street-level bureau-
cracy with a multilayered notion of power as domination. The concept
of domination enables us, ﬁrst, to recognize the impact of health worker
judgements and actions in shaping the behavior of health system users.
Domination also encompasses the deeper eﬀects of health worker
practice in helping to constitute desirable subjects, in line with re-
commendations issued by the health system. Finally, domination allows
us to conceive implementation as accompanied by the reproduction of
inequalities. Bringing together street-level bureaucracy and domina-
tion, we provide a nuanced engagement with health worker power and
its (often unintended) eﬀects in terms of access to health services.
Empirically, we focus on the power of community health workers
(CHWs), a segment of the workforce largely invisible in health policy
discussions. This neglect is at odds with their importance. CHWs have
been routinely presented as essential to healthcare delivery and to the
redressing of inequalities in access to health services, particularly in
low- and middle-income countries. CHW is the name given to close-to-
community providers with no specialized medical training who tradi-
tionally operate as links between doctors, nurses and the population
(Witmer et al., 1995; Olaniran et al., 2017). They can specialize in one
task or carry out a diversity of functions, such as identifying health
needs, particularly of neglected groups; gathering epidemiological data;
scheduling consultations; supporting patients in long-term treatment
and rehabilitation; supporting vaccination programmes and vector-
control; and health education and disease prevention. Speaking to a
burgeoning literature on the lives and experiences of CHWs (Oliver
et al., 2015; Mlotshwa et al., 2015; Maes, 2017), we explore the role of
CHWs in health policy implementation by looking at their practices
(what they do in their day-do-day work); their discursive styles (how
they interact with health system users using particular words and ex-
pressions); and their classiﬁcations (how they make decisions based on
judgements about the behavior of users). We highlight the problematic
aspects of CHW activity by showing how it is traversed by power.
Domination is visible in CHW eﬀorts to shape the behavior of users and
constitute them as ‘healthy subjects’. Domination is also present in the
reproduction of inequalities in access to health services, which emerge
(inadvertently or not) through the practices, discourses and classiﬁca-
tions of CHWs.
Brazil is an ideal setting for exploring how CHWs mobilize power in
the context of a public health system. The country faces great demands
for public policy because of profound inequalities in access to aﬀord-
able healthcare. Brazil has a complex epidemiological proﬁle com-
bining so-called ‘diseases of poverty’ (such as mosquito-borne diseases
or parasitic infections) with diseases prevalent in more developed na-
tions (such as chronic diseases, obesity and heart disease). Brazil's
health system rests upon an uneasy balance between the goal of uni-
versality and equity in access, and the need for policies that consider
heterogeneity along territorial, socioeconomic, cultural, ethnic and
racial lines. Brazilian CHWs have a central role in the government's
drive to broaden access to health services, but they occupy an ambig-
uous position. On the one hand, they are given momentous tasks related
to delivering frontline healthcare to vulnerable and remote populations,
while seeking to alter their behaviors and promote visions of what a
healthy citizen should be. In a context of widespread poverty and
vulnerability, they emerge as powerful actors because of their access to
resources and their ability to inﬂuence community-level health out-
comes. On the other hand, CHWs work within a severely under-re-
sourced health system, which forces them to make resource allocation
decisions without adequate training and based on their own judgements
about the merits of health system users. The context of resource scarcity
and CHW discretion leads to the mobilization of power in ways that
reproduce inequalities in access to health services.
2. ‘Street-level bureaucracy’, power and domination in health
policy analysis
The practice of policy implementation is a core concern of the
‘street-level bureaucracy’ (SLB) approach (Lipsky, 2010 [1980], Hupe
et al., 2015). This approach focuses on street-level bureaucrats – such as
police oﬃcers, teachers or health workers – who work in direct contact
with citizens and mediate their day-to-day relations with authorities.
More than mere conduits, bureaucrats have considerable autonomy and
decision-making powers. These stem from the tension between rules
and the realities on the ground, which often require negotiation and the
exercise of judgment (Møller, 2016). Bureaucrats encounter ambi-
guities and uncertainties, and frequently need to exercise discretion to
determine how the policy is to be implemented (Hupe and Hill, 2007).
Policies are therefore framed, and can be altered, by the discretion of
implementers.
The notion of discretion denotes the leeway given to bureaucrats to
adapt rules to circumstances, in ways that are not always consistent
with directives and goals (Maynard-Moody et al., 2003). It is limited
since it does not capture the strategic logic inherent to the day-to-day
activity of these workers, and the ways in which they exercise power to
shape the meaning of policies and produce eﬀects beyond what was
originally envisaged. Overwhelmingly, the SLB literature sidesteps a
thorough exploration of power by assuming that it stems naturally from
the fact of discretion. It ends up providing a restrictive view of the role
of implementers as power brokers, overlooking diﬀerent modalities and
eﬀects of power present in discretionary decisions and actions.
The SLB approach has been applied to health systems research
(Erasmus, 2014). Examples include studies of Ghanaian community-
based providers (Atinga et al., 2018) and environmental health oﬃcials
(Crook and Ayee, 2006); frontline nurses in Denmark (Harrits and
Møller, 2014) and South Africa (Walker and Gilson, 2004); general
practitioners in the United Kingdom (Checkland, 2004); and family
planning services in Kenya (Kaler and Watkins, 2001). These studies
consider health workers' experiences and perceptions in the face of
challenges such as encroaching privatization or changing patient ex-
pectations. Here, too, there are limits to the SLB over-reliance on dis-
cretion. Noting the limited engagement with the discretionary power of
front-line health professionals, Gilson et al. (2014, iii52) have called for
analyses of the ‘micropractices of power’ inﬂuencing implementation.
The SLB focus on practice needs to be supplemented by a
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consideration of the power permeating street-level work. The notion of
domination oﬀers a useful starting-point, since it encompasses three
modalities of power with diﬀerent eﬀects (Nunes, 2014). The ﬁrst
modality is the shaping of behaviour, not merely by coercion or threat
but also by attempts to deﬁne what is appropriate or acceptable, and by
foreclosing alternatives or dissent (Lukes, 2005). In the second mod-
ality, power emerges as a productive force ‘shaping and governing the
capacities, competences and wills of subjects’ (Rose, 1996, 58). Power is
not simply about prohibiting, but rather constituting subjects in line
with visions of what a ‘good’ or ‘productive’ society should look like.
Instead of conceiving individuals as mere targets of power, this view
sees power as crucial for turning individuals into subjects of a well-
ordered society (Foucault, 2008 [2004]). These two modalities need to
be embedded in a structural context. Power relations occur in, and are
themselves involved in the reproduction of, an uneven ﬁeld in which
certain groups are systematically placed in a position of subordination
in relation to others (Young, 2011 [1990], Lovett, 2010). A third
modality of power can thus be identiﬁed when considering the struc-
tural conditions that allow for certain behaviours and subjects to be
promoted while others are prohibited or constrained, resulting in
hierarchical and unequal outcomes.
Domination supplements discretion in the SLB approach by enabling
an examination of how power operates in the daily practice of bu-
reaucrats: through attempts to shape the behaviour of policy bene-
ﬁciaries; through injunctions to constitute subjects who are predisposed
to think and act in certain ways; and by reinforcing unequal relations in
society. This has important implications for health policy analysis, since
it reveals frontline health workers as nodes in the circulation of power
relations that go beyond coercion, threat or punishment. The activity of
health professionals can be approached against the background of at-
tempts to inﬂuence behaviour and constitute ‘healthy’ subjects in line
with visions of politically and economically useful citizenship
(Nadesan, 2010).
With this framework, health worker practice can be embedded in
context, which is often one of ambiguity. On the one hand, health
professionals are powerful due (at least partly) to their position in the
health system. This gives them access to expert knowledge that is used
to improve health or prevent disease, but also mobilized in ‘gate-
keeping’ roles when making resource allocation decisions (Feather and
Johnstone, 2001). On the other hand, health workers face structural
constraints. Foremost among these is the health system itself, which
often grapples with resource insuﬃciencies, coordination problems and
policy design deﬁciencies. Moreover, health workers are impacted by
the broad political and socioeconomic setting, which determines the
resources available and how they are distributed. By focusing on the
practice and power of health workers, this framework takes their
agency seriously, revealing nuance and complexity in daily interac-
tions. Importantly, agency is shaped and limited by structural con-
straints, although never fully determined.
Another added value for health policy analysis of combining the SLB
approach with the notion of domination is that the former enables
discussions of power to be ﬁrmly grounded on day-to-day practice, thus
avoiding generalizations about how power works and what its eﬀects
are. Thus, our framework does not assume the existence of a con-
sciously dominating group. The reproduction of inequality can be an
unintended consequence, a side-eﬀect or the result of unconscious bias
(Hearn, 2008). We do not assume that health professionals are ne-
cessarily motivated by a malign intention to control, acquire advantage
for themselves or disadvantage others. Instead, our ‘bottom-up’ ap-
proach begins from what health workers do and how they interact with
the beneﬁciaries of policies, against the background of constraints im-
posed by the health system and the socioeconomic context.
In sum, combining the SLB approach with a notion of power as
domination provides a structured yet non-deterministic lens with which
to explore the diverse modalities and impacts of health worker practice.
The remainder of this article applies this framework to the case of
Brazilian community health workers (CHWs). It examines the context of
health policy implementation in Brazil; applies a bottom-up perspective
to the activity of CHWs; and shows how this activity is traversed by
power.
3. Community health workers in Brazil: practices, discourses and
classiﬁcations
3.1. Context of health policy implementation in Brazil
Brazilian community health workers (agentes comunitários de saúde)
are part of the Family Health Strategy (Estratégia Saúde da Família, ESF),
a primary care programme within the (public) Uniﬁed Health System
(Sistema Único de Saúde, SUS). The ESF aims to humanize healthcare,
reduce inequalities and address risk factors, supplementing curative
medicine in hospitals with close-to-community prevention, health
promotion and rehabilitation. It is responsible for referral to other le-
vels of care and thus functions as a gatekeeper in the SUS.
Brazil’s 1988 Constitution lay the general principles for the SUS:
universal access, the reduction of inequalities and the safeguarding of
diversity. As Brazil is a federal state, policies are normally designed and
ﬁnanced by the federal government, with municipalities being re-
sponsible for co-funding, adaptation and implementation. Given the
great territorial, socioeconomic, cultural and ethnic heterogeneity of
the country, federal guidelines are often generic. Even though there is
general agreement on the nature and goals of policies, Brazil witnesses
high levels of ambiguity in implementation, with great scope for health
worker discretion and power. This, combined with chronic under-
funding, coordination problems and demands not originally envisaged,
has generated what Richard E. Matland (1995, 166) termed ‘experi-
mental implementation’, in which ‘outcomes depend heavily on the
resources and actors present in the microimplementing environment’.
The result is signiﬁcant local-level variation.
ESF interventions are undertaken by teams comprising general
practitioners, nurses, nursing assistants and CHWs. Each team is re-
sponsible for an area encompassing 600 to 800 families (Cordoba and
Jeronimo, 2013). There are around 20.000 teams in 80% of Brazilian
municipalities, reaching out to 65 million citizens. To ensure that ser-
vices are provided directly to the families, the program relies heavily on
the frontline work of CHWs recruited from the communities. Each CHW
follows a roughly equal number of families, regardless of the population
size of their territory. The role of CHWs is to bridge the health system
and its users, particularly marginalized and vulnerable groups. Their
responsibilities include: health education and promotion; keeping re-
cords of individuals and families, identifying those at risk; making
regular household visits to monitor the vaccination of children or the
welfare of chronic patients; scheduling maternal health specialist ap-
pointments; advising on the correct use of medication; and contributing
to mosquito-control campaigns (Ministério da Saúde, 2012).
There are currently over 264.000 CHWs in Brazil (Ministério da
Saúde, 2018). CHWs can be hired through public procurement or out-
sourced, with diﬀerent selection processes and contractual arrange-
ments – permanent, temporary, verbal and informal contracts, bur-
saries, among others (Lima and Cockell, 2008). As CHWs come from the
communities where they work, often they are providers and users in the
same healthcare facilities. Proximity with the community means that
they experience ﬁrst-hand the health and socioeconomic vulnerabilities
they are tasked with addressing. They are overwhelmingly women,
with percentages above 75% and in some cases up to 95% (Musse et al.,
2015; Simas and Pinto, 2017). Although the law requires CHWs to have
at least nine years of formal education, the same studies reveal that
65% have completed secondary-level education. Nonetheless, CHWs
are the less professionalized bureaucrats in the ESF. This is com-
pounded by insuﬃciencies in training, which is fragmented, uneven
across the country, reliant on short courses focused on speciﬁc inter-
ventions and often deployed when CHWs are already on the job or in
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response to ongoing crises (Morosini, 2010; Fonseca, 2016). This means
that CHWs are often unprepared to exercise their discretion when re-
sponding to multiple demands and making decisions on how best to use
the system's resources.
3.2. Data collection and analysis
A two-pronged research strategy was applied to investigate how
Brazilian CHWs exercise power. Between 2008 and 2010 an ethno-
graphic study was conducted with 24 CHWs in three municipalities:
Sobral (population 140.000), Taboão da Serra (240.000) and São Paulo
(11 million). Eight CHWs were selected from each municipality using
the following criteria: time on the job, time of residence in the neigh-
borhood, and involvement in community activities. In 2016 and 2017
interviews were also conducted with 77 CHWs from eleven primary
health clinics in the city of São Paulo. These workers were selected
considering diﬀerences in age and service time. CHWs were asked to
tell stories of families they engage with, describing easy and diﬃcult
situations they encountered, how they judge situations, make decisions
and justify them. Samples from two time periods revealed stability in
CHW practice, continuity in the overarching health policies in which
CHW work is embedded, as well as similar socioeconomic vulner-
abilities. Fieldwork was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of
the Federal University of ABC Region, Brazil.
Data was analyzed in NVivo. The ﬁrst step of coding used a
grounded approach and involved identifying the activities carried out
by CHWs during implementation (practices), how they interacted with
users (discursive styles, based on words and oral expressions used), and
how they made judgments about, and categorized, users (classiﬁca-
tions). This tripartite analysis uses a rationale similar to Timothy Hoﬀ’s
(2013) taxonomy of implementation practices, in which hard practices
(measurable and visible procedures; corresponding to our practices) are
distinguished from soft practices (relational and discursive mechan-
isms; corresponding to our discursive styles and classiﬁcations). In a
second, axial coding, we grouped all the codes according to conceptual
categories. (see Image 1)
3.3. Practices: what CHWs do
We identiﬁed 108 practices – representing what CHWs do when
exercising their discretion – and grouped them in 7 categories. Table 1
presents the incidence of each category in relation to the total of
practices observed. Overall, 45% of the practices of CHWs are not
predicted in any guidelines or regulations – for example, activities re-
lated to community mobilization and the claiming of rights. Work is
marked by a high degree of discretion and informality, as CHWs con-
stantly grapple with unforeseen demands and constraints in a context of
resource scarcity.
3.4. Discursive styles: how CHWs interact
Discursive styles are relational mechanisms, identiﬁed by words and
expressions used during interactions. They help to determine the kind
of relationship emerging in a speciﬁc context (Goﬀman, 1974; McLean,
2007). They are crucial in the day-to-day activity of CHWs, enabling
them to shape how the interaction will unfold – in other words, how
health system users are treated and thus how policies are implemented.
We identiﬁed 24 discursive styles and grouped them in 4 categories.
Table 2 shows the percentage of CHWs using each category.
3.5. Classiﬁcations: how CHWs judge and categorize users
The day-to-day running of health systems requires that its users are
classiﬁed. Interviews with CHWs included the questions: which types of
users do you treat; which users are easier or more diﬃcult to treat; and
how do you justify this diﬀerence? Answers revealed the coexistence of
two processes of judgment and classiﬁcation. The ﬁrst type of classiﬁ-
cation is the oﬃcial scheme of the health system, which categorizes
users according to gender, race, age and type of illness. However, of-
ﬁcial categories are inadequate when CHWs are forced to make allo-
cation decisions in a context of informality and resource scarcity
(something they are not oﬃcially mandated to do). CHWs resort to
another classiﬁcation scheme, based on the degree of adherence or
resistance to treatments and recommendations. In this scheme, users
fall into two categories: ‘easy’ patients, who are committed to treat-
ment, follow recommendations and show respect towards CHWs; and
‘diﬃcult’ ones, who do not follow recommendations, are hostile or do
not value CHWs. The former are ‘those who obey us and follow treat-
ment’ (CHW52 Int); ‘those who care about their own health’ (CHW13,
CHW38, CHW47 Int); or ‘those who want to be treated’ (CHW9 Int).
The latter are referred to as ‘those who do not listen to our advice’
(CHW22, CHW 44 Int); or ‘the irresponsible ones who do not go to the
appointments and do not follow treatment’ (CHW19 Int).
Three justiﬁcations underpin this unoﬃcial classiﬁcation. The ﬁrst,
relating to morality and behavior, is visible in statements like: ‘ado-
lescents are irresponsible because they only want to go to the disco and
do not take care of their health’ (CHW35 Int); ‘there are mothers who
are not careful with their children’ (CHW3 Int); ‘the young pregnant
women are irresponsible’ (CHW11, CHW22, CHW45, CHW59 Int).
Moral judgements are used to present some patients as docile: ‘the
polite elderly’ (CHW7, CHW32, Int); ‘the hardworking people’ (CHW11
Int). The second justiﬁcation projects a typical socioeconomic and
cultural user proﬁle: ‘common and structured families’ (that is, the
heteronormative family) (CHW8, CHW18, CHW39, CHW72 Int); ‘the
poorest and most humble’ (CHW58 Int). Those from diﬀerent cultural
backgrounds (who are also traditionally poorer), such as immigrants
from the Brazilian Northeast, Bolivians and Nigerians, are deemed po-
tentially resistant. Families that do not conform to commonly-observed
models – for example single mother households – are deemed poten-
tially problematic. Finally, users are classiﬁed as resistant or adherent
in line with their pathology, which may help or complicate treatment.
Adherent patients are identiﬁed with health conditions, like chronic
diseases, that make them ‘responsible’ in relation to care and hence
‘deserving’. Resistance is commonly associated with drug users, alco-
holics, psychiatric patients, the homeless and people with commu-
nication diﬃculties. The nature of their condition is seen to hinder
Image 1. Synthetizes the analytical logic of the paper.
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interaction with CHWs and continuity in treatment.
4. The power of CHWs: changing behavior
The analysis of CHW activity shows the multiple sites where power
is mobilized and reveals the usefulness of the multilayered notion of
domination. Changing behaviour, a typical function of street-level bu-
reaucrats, is most obvious in the day-to-day activity of Brazilian CHWs.
Its centrality can be explained by the speciﬁc demands and require-
ments of the ESF, a primary health strategy that seeks to reduce the
frequency of hospital-based care by promoting healthy choices and
behaviours. Behaviour change is also explained by the Brazilian health
system, which combines an aspiration to universality with the realities
of diversity, inequality and insuﬃcient resources. This context forces
CHWs to establish criteria of prioritization and even inclusion/exclu-
sion for public policies. Changing behaviour often becomes necessary
for granting access to beneﬁts and programmes. This happens in the
SUS and in relation to other social policies like Bolsa Família, the gov-
ernment's cash-transfer scheme with conditionalities related to health
behaviours (like the vaccination of children), which CHWs are tasked
with monitoring.
The importance of behavior change can be ascertained by the high
incidence of practices of ‘Orientation, information and referrals’
(21.6%), ‘Clinical treatment, prevention and health promotion’ (13.6%)
and ‘Compliance’ (5.7%). Here, the power of CHWs stems from their
unique position at the intersection of three realms: the health system,
through which they access expert knowledge and state resources; the
community, where they gain awareness of micro-level dynamics and
access lay knowledge (including alternative healing practices); and the
domestic setting where a signiﬁcant portion of their practices are car-
ried out. Even though their actual degree of access to people's homes
varies (since users are not forced to open their doors), CHWs are almost
always able to get an insider knowledge of users' living conditions
because they are community members, neighbors, and sometimes even
family members. CHWs traverse the private-public divide in ways that
other health professionals cannot, and this places them in a privileged
position to shape behavior.
CHWs sometimes seek to impose health behavior through appeals to
authority and by the distribution of rewards, threats and punishments.
This happens when they assume a hierarchical discursive style with
non-compliers. 38.7% of CHWs studied seek to shape behavior by es-
tablishing hierarchies in their interactions. A CHW was seen threa-
tening a young woman who did not take her pills: ‘I will come back here
tomorrow and if you don't take them properly I will tell your parents'
(CHW8 Ethn). Another CHW angrily scolded a mother: ‘Why did you
have a child if you are not patient enough? If I know you're hitting him,
I'll bring the police here’ (CHW12 Ethn). Another told us how she
convinced a patient to have her baby vaccinated: ‘I tried to convince her
many times [and] she didn't listen to me …. But one day I told her: if
you don't have him vaccinated, you will lose the Bolsa Família. And then
she decided to comply’ (CHW17 Ethn). Hierarchies are also established
when CHWs make promises: ‘you take care of your health and I will see
if I can get you a job’ (CHW2 Ethn). Even though their in-depth
knowledge of users' lives (such as family relations or job situation) is a
condition for the success of their interventions, it opens the door to
abuses when in attempting to shape behavior CHWs position them-
selves as powerful in relation to users who are already in situations of
vulnerability.
When shaping behavior, CHWs routinely aﬃrm a distinction be-
tween ‘me’ or ‘we’ (the health services) and ‘you’ (the users), based on
appeals to authoritative knowledge – the idea that ‘we’ know better
than ‘you’ about how to live a healthy life. For example, a CHW told a
man who did not take his medicines that ‘we do everything we can for
you. We know what we are doing because we study to know what to do’
(CHW9 Ethn). In these appeals, behavior is shaped by re-inscribing
distance. In other cases, appeals are more ambiguous, based both on
Table 1
Practices of Brazilian CHWs, as observed during ethnography in Sobral, Taboão da Serra and São Paulo, 2008–2010.
Source: CHW activities observed during ethnography were organized in categories. The column on the right presents the incidence of each category of practice in
relation to the total of practices observed.
Category of practice Example Incidence (%)
Orientation, information and referrals Explaining the location of services or how to access them 21.6
Team and management support Participating in management activities in the clinic 20.4
Information management Filling out forms 15.9
Treatment, prevention and health promotion Explaining how to prevent diseases 13.6
Mobilization and rights Engaging users in local council discussions 8.4
Compliance Checking if patients are taking medicines properly 5.7
Others Giving information about other services 14.7
Total 100
Table 2
Discursive styles of Brazilian CHWs, as observed during ethnography in Sobral, Taboão da Serra and São Paulo, 2008–2010.
Source: Words and expressions used by CHWs were categorized along discursive styles, following McLean (2007). The column on the right presents the percentage of
CHWs using the discursive style during interactions.
Category of discursive style Explanation and examples % of CHWs
Mediation Translating information into language that can be understood and remembered
Example: in response to a patient who could not read the prescription and did not know how to take the medicines, the CHW
mediated the information: ‘this orange-colored pill reminds us of the orange juice we drink in the morning, so you take the orange
medicine every morning. And these two white pills you can take with milk, which is also white, when you go to bed’. (CHW 8 Ethn)a
77,1
Facilitating understanding Contextualizing and adapting information to local realities (using references to family, religion or lay knowledge)
Example: a CHW tells the patient: ‘what is happening to you is the same that happened to our neighbor, Ana. Do you remember how
she was and how I helped her?’. (CHW 23 Ethn)
70
Making relations horizontal Establishing symmetrical reciprocity and proximity
Examples: a CHW tells the patient: ‘you and I we have been through very similar situations in our lives’ or ‘you don't need to thank
me. This is only my obligation’ (CHW 12 Ethn)
65
Making relations hierarchical Establishing distance through authority or magnanimity
Example: a CHW tells the patient: ‘I can do this for [your husband], but you have to tell him this is not my obligation’. (CHW 8 Ethn)
38,7
a Citations are identiﬁed by the number ascribed to each CHW and specify whether the data was collected during interview (Int) or ethnography (Ethn).
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science and on CHWs' own experiences and beliefs. Responding to a
situation in which a feverish child was being given homemade medi-
cines, the CHW combined his own opinions with oﬃcial guidelines,
advising the mother: ‘homemade medicine is not always the best op-
tion. You should give him a spoonful of honey and don't let him walk
around without shoes. If that doesn't work, get him to a healer [re-
zadeira] and later bring him to the doctor’ (CHW9 Ethn). Here, to es-
tablish proximity with the user, the shaping of behavior mixed appeals
to traditional medicine and biomedicine.
5. The power of CHWs: producing citizens
The classiﬁcation of users as resistant or adherent combines the
shaping of behavior with the constitution of subjects. It is underpinned
by moral judgments and by the expectation of user predispositions to
act in certain ways. When classifying users, CHWs do not just seek to
change behavior but also advance an ideal subject of care. Good pa-
tients are malleable subjects that yield to the inﬂuence of CHWs and are
predisposed to behave in light of recommendations. Good patients also
follow CHW expectations of a desirable moral life. Ideas of motherhood
are a good example. One CHW explained how she recognizes a ‘good
mother’ (a concept she brought up during the interview): ‘to be a good
mother you have to learn how to take care of yourself. We cannot
overburden our children. They need to be taken care of’ (CHW27 Int).
For another CHW, the most diﬃcult patients are ‘young mothers. They
are irresponsible because they do not know who the fathers of their
children are and do not have a family structure to care for their chil-
dren’ (CHW38 Int).
CHWs also advance visions of the ideal beneﬁciary of the health
system. They routinely tell users how they should behave in the clinic,
how they should treat CHWs and relate with public authorities. In this
way, CHWs help to constitute individuals as subjects of the state. Much
of the work of CHWs seeks to enhance the position of users vis à vis the
state. Through ‘Mobilization and rights-based activities’, CHWs involve
users in community activities and in the life of local institutions.
Activities under this rubric may include IT classes for the elderly or
support groups for single mothers or victims of abuse. In these, users are
recognized as rights-bearing citizens. CHWs help to elucidate how
rights can be accessed and how users can participate in policy decisions.
A vision of active citizenship, community engagement and belonging is
advanced.
In their discursive styles, CHWs determine the degree of proximity
or distance between the state and citizens. Discursive styles that hier-
archize relations tell users that they know less or are less powerful than
state representatives. When CHWs use discursive styles that render re-
lations horizontal, users are brought closer to state authorities. One
example is the use of common references, when CHWs mention the
names of people or institutions (like churches or associations) known to
both interlocutors, thus signaling shared social references. When a
CHW declares that ‘every patient is a reﬂection of his CHW’ (CHW66
Ethn), a particular form of reciprocity is established in which an ideal
health system user (and citizen) is projected alongside injunctions to-
wards ‘responsible’ or compliant behaviors. At the same time, the po-
sition of the CHW as role model is reaﬃrmed. As with the shaping of
behavior, the task of producing ‘good citizens’ - those that deserve to be
taken care of by the state – is done by Brazilian CHWs in a challenging
and ambiguous context where aspirations to universal access to public
healthcare clash with the reality of insuﬃcient resources. The CHW-as-
role model is never separate from the CHW-as-gatekeeper.
6. The power of CHWs: reproducing inequality
The activity of Brazilian CHWs is permeated with situations that
undermine the health system's vision of universality and equality. For
example, in practices of ‘Orientation, information and referrals’, which
represent 21.6% of activities, we observed that some CHWs only
provide advice ‘by the book’, that is, on services under their responsi-
bility, while others go beyond and oﬀer guidance on informal ways of
accessing the system. Some CHWs make personal referrals to other
health professionals or ask for favors inside the health clinic for a
speciﬁc patient. Others seek to solve problems not related to the health
system, like helping users ﬁnd a job or secure a place in school for their
children.
The decision between ‘oﬃcial’ and ‘non-oﬃcial’ referrals is some-
times connected to practical considerations. Trying to work around
constraints or ﬁnd creative solutions requires eﬀort and time. Given the
lack of resources, multiple demands and overwork, it is not always
possible to devote this level of attention to users' needs. Many CHWs
decide to make their own lives easier and work strictly according to
guidelines. In other cases, decisions are based on the degree of de-
servedness ascribed to users, which in turn is based on classiﬁcation
processes. If users are deemed adherent, CHWs will oﬀer more than the
oﬃcial information and activate other channels, helping citizens access
services more easily. For others, the CHW might say: ‘I can't because
this is not my obligation’ (CHW29 Int). Since referrals are in part de-
termined by how users are classiﬁed by individual CHWs, cases with the
same clinical picture can follow diﬀerent trajectories in the healthcare
and public service system. Through their discretion, CHWs have the
power to determine who gets what, based on the classiﬁcations they
attribute to users. Put diﬀerently, they can decide who will access re-
sources and who will be excluded.
Classiﬁcation processes based on moral and behavioral factors, and
even on certain health conditions, emerge as potentially exclusionary.
Even within the strict remit of CHW responsibility, users are treated
diﬀerently based on how they are classiﬁed. Adherent users, with
whom it is possible to build rapport, become deserving and receive
more attention and resources (specialist appointments and household
visits for example). Resistant users are often considered unworthy of the
system's scarce resources. One CHW said: ‘I don't waste appointments
with this kind of user’ (CHW17 Int). For some users, vulnerability and
exclusion become mutually reinforcing. The high vulnerability of cer-
tain groups – such as drug users, pregnant teenagers or patients with
psychological disorders – leads to non-compliance with treatments and
recommendations. They are thus classiﬁed as non-adherent.
Nonetheless, their health condition would precisely require more at-
tention. The classiﬁcation, and its underpinning judgments, exclude a
patient proﬁle that should be a priority. In these cases, non-adherence is
less an individual choice than further evidence of vulnerability, which
is aggravated when CHWs classify these users as undeserving and shut
down part of the state's doors to them.
Brazilian CHWs can therefore contribute to the reproduction of
existing inequalities in access to health services and in treatment by the
health system. This happens in a material sense because CHWs are
routinely involved in allocative inclusion and exclusion processes. Even
though they are not formally entrusted with gatekeeping roles, CHWs
work as part of the ESF, a programme that is designed to make referrals
to other levels of care. Moreover, in a context of discretion and resource
scarcity CHWs act as de facto gatekeepers in the system, making deci-
sions about the eligibility of citizens or imposing sanctions. In practice,
their actions and decisions help to determine the quality and quantity of
beneﬁts available to users. CHWs also impact upon inequalities in a
symbolic way as they judge each situation and classify users, thus de-
ciding who is worthy of receiving services, and what they deserve to
receive.
These eﬀects, although stemming from the discretion and power of
CHWs, are conditioned by Brazil's deeply contradictory health system.
Inequalities in access become the by-product of a system that aspires to
universality without suﬃcient resources; that requires local-level ﬂex-
ibility without providing frontline workers with the training to deal
with policy ambiguity and make informed allocation decisions; and that
has failed to provide adequate design, implementation and monitor-
ization of policies to respond to great inequality and heterogeneity. In
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this situation, the role of the CHW is ambiguous, oscillating between
the goal of expanding access and the reality of demand management.
On the one hand, CHWs are deployed to open the doors of the system to
the most vulnerable groups; on the other, they end up functioning as
the system's foremost gatekeepers.
By reproducing inequalities in access to health, and by treating users
diﬀerently, CHWs can contribute to reinforcing broader social vulner-
abilities. The Brazilian CHW programme has been accused of con-
tributing to a chasm between technologically-developed services for
privileged groups and a ‘low-tech’ (and frequently under-resourced)
assistance to the poor (Favoreto and Camargo, 2002). According to this
interpretation, and while they provide essential services to groups who
would otherwise be neglected, CHWs end up becoming a ‘band-aid’ that
epitomizes the structural exclusion of the poor from the highest stan-
dards of healthcare. Whilst everyone can beneﬁt from CHW visits, this
does not necessarily mean access to the full range of services available
in the public health system – for example, specialist appointments have
been identiﬁed as a ‘bottleneck’ (Spedo et al., 2010). The number of
appointments that CHWs can provide is well below actual needs, and
poor people can wait years to access services that others will pay for in
the private sector. Brazilian CHWs are co-opted in the reproduction of a
system that, in its current form, fails to respond to deep-seated vul-
nerabilities and breeds socioeconomic inequalities.
7. Conclusion
This article analyzed the role of power in policy implementation.
Combining street-level bureaucracy with a notion of power as dom-
ination, we showed that implementers are not powerless or apolitical,
neither work simply as diplomats persuading or engaging actors (Gale
et al., 2017). Rather, they exercise power in asymmetric relations.
These ﬁndings are relevant to the analysis of implementation in situa-
tions of informality, where proximity between implementers and users,
and the discretion of the former, is encouraged as a pathway for ‘con-
text-speciﬁc’ and ‘culturally-sensitive’ interventions. Informality has the
potential to lead to unequal power relations, particularly when com-
bined with inadequate training and resources.
The article focused on Brazil's community health workers. We ex-
plored what these workers do, how they interact with users, how they
make decisions and how these decisions are justiﬁed. We argued that
their work is marked by discretion in a context of informality and re-
source scarcity, thus providing ample space for the exercise of power.
The power of CHWs operates not simply by shaping behavior. It also
constitutes subjects and reproduces inequality in terms of how users are
received by the health system, and their degree of access to the range of
services available. The power of Brazilian CHWs is visible not only in
decisions about which practices they will carry out, how and towards
whom, but also in constituting individuals as ‘deserving’ or ‘under-
serving’. CHWs use unoﬃcial classiﬁcation schemes based on personal
worldviews, their expectations about the profession, their perceptions
of how well they are valued by users, their moral conceptions of what is
right or wrong, and stereotypes about the poor and vulnerable (even
though many CHWs experience the same vulnerabilities). These clas-
siﬁcations help to determine access to the health system and shape how
users are treated if access is granted. These ﬁndings question an over-
whelmingly positive view of the impact of CHWs in terms of promoting
social justice and empowerment (Becker et al., 2004; Pérez and
Martinez, 2008; Ingram et al., 2008). We demonstrated that the picture
is more complicated, and that the concrete workings of power relations
need to be scrutinized when assessing the impact of CHW programmes.
The case of Brazil shows that the (unregulated) mobilization of
power by implementers can be, at least in part, complicit in the re-
production of inequality in access to, and treatment by, the health
system. In this sense, inequality is reproduced not because of the failure
or absence of policy, but as a by-product or unintended (and sometimes
unnoticed) consequence of the policies designed to alleviate inequality.
CHW discretion and power cannot be separated from the Brazilian
context of resource scarcity, economic inequalities, heterogeneity and
extremely high levels of demand. This context places tremendous
pressures upon CHWs. While being asked to alleviate inequality by
expanding access and reaching out to vulnerable groups, CHWs end up
functioning as de facto gatekeepers to healthcare and public services,
making crucial decisions about who gets what – despite not being
trained or mandated to do so.
The wide scope for CHW discretion and power reﬂects the tensions,
ambiguities and contradictions of the Brazilian health system. It is
partly the result of insuﬃcient resources and deﬁcient coordination, but
also a way to enable responsiveness in the face of heterogeneity. CHW
discretion can provide the health system with greater ﬂexibility and
resilience, helping it adapt to multiple and changing demands. In Brazil,
CHWs can lead to more inclusive policies when they engage in non-
hierarchical ways with diﬀerent user experiences and forms of knowl-
edge, and when they mediate and translate policies to facilitate un-
derstanding by users. CHWs also promote inclusivity by allowing the
system to take on board the heterogeneity of territories and users.
On the other hand, the discretion of Brazilian CHWs has led to ad-
verse eﬀects. These can be partly explained by inadequate training of
CHWs, who are unprepared to make allocation decisions. Lack of at-
tention and control over CHW discretion, and insuﬃcient awareness of
the power mobilized by CHWs, also reinforces the exclusionary and
inequality-inducing side-eﬀects of policies. The discretion and power of
CHWs should be closely considered during the design, management and
evaluation of policies, as well as in the training of all health profes-
sionals. An awareness of the potential pitfalls of CHW activity is a
crucial step towards designing and implementing health policies that
can eﬀectively reduce inequality.
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